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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE
OF RELIGIOUS INCLUSIVISM
BERND IRLENBORN
Th eologische Fakultät Paderborn
Abstract. Faced by the challenge of religious plurality, most philosophers of re-
ligion view pluralism and exclusivism as the most accepted and fully developed 
positions. Th e third alternative, the model of inclusivism, held especially within 
the catholic tradition, has not received adequate attention in the debates in phi-
losophy of religion, perhaps as it is based solely on theological grounds. In this 
essay I off er a philosophical defense of the position of religious inclusivism and 
give reasons why this position represents the most appropriate position in the 
face of confl icting religious truth claims. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Religious plurality today presents a signifi cant challenge. Th ere exist 
a plurality of religious traditions, each with diff erent teachings and prac-
tices, and each is further diff erentiated internally into various movements 
and interpretations.1 To the extent that these traditions are grounded 
in particular truth claims and call for the dissemination of their own 
teaching and way of life, many powerful theological, philosophical and 
political challenges are created. By ‘challenge’ I mean the cognitive call-
ing into question of the truth of a certain belief or attitude generated by 
other doctrines or practices. Th ere are at least four ways beliefs can be 
challenged: One position can negate another (marking a contradictory 
relationship between propositions), dissent from it (contrary relation-
ship), diverge from it (divergent relationship) or, despite its otherness, 
1 Cf. David Basinger, Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, Aldershot 
2002, 2f.; Hendrik M. Vroom, A Spectrum of Worldviews. An Introduction to Philoso-
phy of Religion in a Pluralistic World, Amsterdam 2006, 254.
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correspond to it (convergent relationship). Concerning the plurality of 
religious beliefs, I would like to distinguish three spheres in which such 
challenges are felt: 
 (1) Th e intra-religious sphere: In the face of the plurality of religions, 
a given religious community is prompted to clarify the unique-
ness of its own religious beliefs, and explore whether and to what 
extent the awareness of the religious views of others might lead it 
to defi ne more precisely or revise its own teachings.2 
 (2) Th e inter-religious sphere: Th is is the sphere of debate that con-
cerns models that defi ne the relationship between rival religious 
truth claims, but also the consequences of the intra-religious 
questioning of these truth claims. 
 (3) Th e extra-religious sphere: Th is is the sphere where the relation-
ship between plural religious beliefs and other beliefs or convic-
tions is defi ned within the liberal framework of the secular state. 
It is also the sphere for debating the conditions under which re-
ligious citizens might make public use of reason.
In this essay I focus solely on the second aspect: the inter-religious chal-
lenge of religious plurality. From the perspective of theology and phi-
losophy of religion, there are three well-known models of the relation-
ship between the plurality of divergent religious beliefs: exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism. Th ese theories arise mostly on the basis of 
epistemological considerations. Exclusivism and inclusivism are related 
models, insofar as both claim the superiority of a particular religion; 
they diff er roughly in that the other religion is in its core tenets3 untrue 
for the exclusivist, but only partially untrue for the inclusivist. At its core, 
the term ‘pluralism’ incorporates at least the following assumptions: 
(i) the plurality of competing religious truth claims is a fact, and must be 
accepted,4 (ii) there is no generally acknowledged religious metaposition 
2 Cf. Harold Coward, Religious Pluralism and the Future of Religions, in: Th omas 
Dean (ed.), Religious Pluralism and Truth, New York 1995, 45-63, 45f.
3 Core tenets of a religion are doctrines and teachings to which assent is religiously 
required of all believers.
4 As William C. Smith puts it: “Plurality, the existence of diversity, is a fact; pluralism, 
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from which to judge rival truth claims,5 and (iii) religious truth claims 
are at best mytho logically, not literally, true with regard to the nature of 
ultimate reality.6 Th e three models also describe the relevant attitudes of 
diff erent religions toward each other: either a relationship of superiority 
or one of equality between the diff erent truth claims of the religions.7 In 
virtue of the fact that numerous intricate varieties can be distinguished 
within the three models, these concepts can be further diff erentiated – 
though I am not going to do so – and a religious position can contain 
elements of diff erent models.8
Faced by the challenge of religious diversity, most philosophers of reli-
gion take the view that pluralism and exclusivism are, according to Philip 
L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, “the most fully developed positions”.9 Or, as 
David Basinger claims, there are only “two basic responses to the reality 
of religious diversity: religious exclusivism and religious pluralism”.10 In 
this context inclusivism “faces a less certain future”11 or even, according 
to John Hick, constitutes a “somewhat astonishing doctrine”.12 I would 
the acceptance of diversity, is an imperative.” See William C. Smith, Religious Diversity, 
New York 1976, xviii.
5 A version of exclusivism can also be inferred from (ii): see William P. Alston, Per-
ceiving God. Th e Epistemology of Religious Experience, New York 1993, 274.
6 Cf. Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion: Does Faith need Reason?, Oxford 1998, 
53. On facets of religious pluralism see: Keith Yandell, Some Varieties of Religious Plural-
ism, in: James Kellenberger (ed.), Inter-Religious Models and Criteria, New York 1993, 
187-211, here 187-194.
7 Does Comparative Th eology constitute, as claimed, a separate model? See James 
L. Fredericks, Faith among Faiths. Christian Th eology and Non-Christian Religions, 
New York 1999, 9. I do not endorse this view. I think that Comparative Th eology does 
not present a fourth model, but at best a hermeneutically sensitive variant of inclusivism 
or exclusivism. Here is not the place to give reasons for my claim.
8 For a detailed description of these models see Gavin D’Costa, Christianity and 
World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Th eology of Religion, Oxford 2009, 3-33.
9 Kevin Meeker/Philip L. Quinn, Introduction, in: idem (eds.), Th e Philosophical 
Challenge of Religious Diversity, New York 2000, 1-37, 27.
10 David Basinger, Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, 4.
11 Ibid., 27. Another reason for the unpopularity of inclusivism might be, as Jonathan 
L. Kvanvig states, that inclusivism is “the most diffi  cult position to clarify in this scheme”. 
See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Religious Pluralism and the Buridan’s Ass Paradox, European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2009), 1-26, 3.
12 John Hick, Religious Pluralism and Salvation, in: Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988), 
365-377, 376.
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like to call these views into question. As Quinn and Meeker have em-
phasised, although many religious persons hold the inclusivist view, “no 
one has yet undertaken to provide the same detailed defense of inclusiv-
ism that is evident in Hick’s defense of pluralism or Alston’s defense of 
exclusivism.”13 In this essay, I develop a response to this defi ciency and 
formulate some philosophical arguments towards a defense of inclusiv-
ism. Perhaps, because Christians have defended it solely on the basis of 
theological grounds, inclusivism has not received adequate attention in 
the debates in philosophy of religion.14 Th e inclusivist position seems to 
me to be the most realistic and tenable response to the challenge of me-
diating divergent religious truth claims in the intra- and inter-religious 
spheres without either relativising all of them to mere mythological state-
ments or deeming only the claims of one religion to be true and the rest 
to be false. Here is not the place to refer to the extensive debates about 
pluralism and exclusivism or to give detailed reasons why pluralism and 
exclusivism are not, in my view, “the most fully developed positions” for 
coping with confl icting religious truth claims. 
I am going to call the position that holds that there is a compatibility 
among competing religious truth claims epistemic inclusivism, because 
it pertains primarily to epistemological considerations about religious 
truth claims and not to theological considerations about the way of sal-
vation. In the fi rst section I analyse the idea of inclusivism within the 
catholic tradition. In the second section I sketch a philosophical view 
of inclusivism and give reasons for thinking that it constitutes the most 
viable position in response to the challenge of divergent religious truth 
claims. Th e third section presents a brief conclusion.
II. THE IDEA OF INCLUSIVISM
If neither pluralism nor exclusivism are appropriate responses to the 
problem of religious diversity, what reasons would there then be to 
13 Kevin Meeker/Philip L. Quinn, Introduction, in: idem (eds.), Th e Philosophical 
Challenge of Religious Diversity, New York 2000, 1-37, 27.
14 See for instance Karl Rahner’s famous concept of the “anonymous Christian”: Karl 
Rahner, Christiantity and the Non-Religions, in: Th eological Investigations, vol. 5, Lon-
don 1966, 115-134.
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support a position of epistemic inclusivism? I would like to defend the 
following position: Th e inclusivist position opens up the only concep-
tual possibility for a believer upholding the exclusivity of her own truth 
claims (against pluralism), without declaring the divergent belief, or the 
central truth claims of that belief, to be false (against exclusivism). In-
clusivism and exclusivism share the view that the doctrines of the home 
religion are true and the truth claims of other religions incompatible 
with them are false. But inclusivism diff ers from (at least a traditional 
and more restrictive) exclusivism on the question, “whether it is possible 
for an alien religion to include any true claim among its doctrines and 
teachings.”15 According to inclusivism, the exclusivity of a truth claim of 
the home religion excludes incompatible alien truth claims, though not 
a possible inclusion of the truth of the home religion in the alien belief 
system. Th e inclusivist can accept the fact of religious diversity and man-
age that fact conceptually without having to deny the superiority of her 
own standpoint. Th is kind of inclusivism should not be understood, as 
David Basinger claims,16 as a derivative “soft  exclusivism”, but as a model 
in its own right that remains distinct from exclusivism and pluralism. 
Correct terminology is important here. Any position that acknowledges, 
theologically, the salvifi c force, or, philosophically, the inclusivity of at 
least one of its own basic truth claims within the tenets of a diff erent 
religion, should be considered as an inclusivism and not as an inclusive 
or “soft  exclusivism”.
Yet how can one think that the other religious belief is possibly only 
partially true? Is such a view, and therefore the inclusivist position as 
a whole, at all tenable, bearing in mind the principle of bivalence con-
tained in classical logic – according to which any proposition is either 
true or false, but not true and false at the same time, and therefore not 
‘partially’ true? Th e inclusivist standpoint maintained by the Catholic 
Church for instance is based fi rstly on Biblical witness, and then on theo-
logical refl ection concerning the radius and centre of the divine salvifi c 
will. Regarding the truth claims of other religions, the Second Vatican 
Council states with regard to other religions:
15 Paul J. Griffi  ths, Problems of Religious Diversity, Oxford 2001, 57.
16 David Basinger, Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, 5.
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Th e Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. 
She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those 
precepts and teachings which, though diff ering in many aspects from the 
ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless oft en refl ect a ray of that Truth 
which enlightens all men. Indeed, she proclaims, and ever must proclaim 
Christ ‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (John 14:6), in whom men may 
fi nd the fullness of religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to 
Himself.17
Th is notion revolves primarily around St. Justin’s Christian interpreta-
tion of the Stoic idea of the logos spermatikos.18 Th eologically, this idea 
states that there are or may be ‘grains’ of truth in other religions; a “ray 
of that Truth” (radius illius veritatis) that Christians recognise in Christ 
shines through them.19 Th is passage implies a distinction between alethic 
inclusivism and relativistic inclusivism. Both versions hold that (a) there 
exists an absolute truth or set of true assertions about God. Only the lat-
ter holds that (b) no religion is able to ascertain fully the absolute truth 
or the complete set of true assertions about God and (c) every religion 
can at best ascertain partially the absolute truth or the true assertions 
about God. ‘Inclusivism’ in the Catholic sense refers to an alethic, that 
is truth-inductive inclusivism, which defends the position that one par-
ticular religion is able to ascertain, as the passage says, “the fullness” of 
God’s truth in Jesus Christ. 
But this might turn out to be more complicated than it seems at fi rst 
glance; in light of the fact that within the Catholic tradition the concept 
of truth – without relativising the truth claim of the Church’s own teach-
17 “Ecclesia catholica nihil eorum, quae in his religionibus vera et sancta sunt, reicit. 
Sincera cum observantia considerat illos modos agendi et vivendi, illa praecepta et doc-
trinas, quae, quamvis ab iis quae ipsa tenet et proponit in multis discrepent, haud raro 
referunt tamen radium illius Veritatis, quae illuminat omnes homines. Annuntiat vero et 
annuntiare tenetur indesinenter Christum, qui est ‘via et veritas et vita’ (Io 14,6), in quo 
homines plenitudinem vitae religiosae inveniunt, in quo Deus omnia Sibi reconciliavit” 
(emphasis added), in: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Reli-
gions Nostra Aetate, no. 2. See also the Decree on the Mission Activity of the Church Ad 
gentes, no. 11.
18 Concerning this model from a theology of religious pluralism perspective, see: 
Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Th eology of Religious Pluralism, New York 1997, 
53-60.
19 Cf. Nostra Aetate, no. 2.
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ing – is construed historically, insofar as “every truth attained is but a step 
towards that fullness of truth which will appear with the fi nal Revelation 
of God.”20 Th is distinction between a ‘truth attained’ (veritas capta) and 
the ‘fullness’ of truth (veritas ultima) would entail, unintentionally, not 
alethic but a version of relativistic inclusivism. Th is distinction can be 
expressed within the metaphor found in Nostra Aetate, the document of 
the Second Vatican Council cited above. So, read in light of this distinc-
tion, we see that Christians, too, do not yet see all the rays of the Truth 
that is the event of Christ, but, in contrast to non-Christians, they do 
now see at least those rays that reveal it to be the event of Christ. Th is 
metaphorical view might explain why the Catholic tradition adheres to 
an alethic inclusivism. However, in the sentence of the Encyclical Letter 
Fides et Ratio about the distinction between the veritas capta and the 
veritas ultima it remains problematic, how under these conditions key 
tenets of Christian faith can be conceived of as being fundamentally fi nal 
and irrevocable. Th is problem indicates that the talk of the logos sper-
matikos remains more of a metaphor, which does not take us very far in 
analyzing the basic problem of an inclusivist position. 
Th e fi rst question to be addressed is the meaning of inclusivity or 
inclusion in the term ‘inclusivism’. Based on the passage quoted from 
Nostra Aetate, inclusivity denotes the notion that a particular set of truth 
claims or at least one truth claim of a religion P (here Christianity in the 
Catholic tradition) is contained, or included, in a diff erent religion S. 
‘Inclusion’ is tantamount to ‘containment’. So literally, ‘inclusion’ means 
that a truth claim or a set of truth claims of P is contained in S. Th e rela-
tion of inclusion is stated by a particular religion that assesses the occur-
rence of its own truth claims within the set of truth claims of diff erent 
religions. It requires an outright interreligious commitment on the part 
of the inclusivist to analyse carefully the truth claims of diff erent reli-
gions before stating any form of inclusivity.
How can the notion of inclusion be stated more precisely? Since set 
theory construes ‘inclusion’ as a particular relationship of containment 
between two sets of elements, it might be helpful to clarify the idea of 
20 “… conscia sit omnem veritatem captam unam dumtaxat stationem esse plenam 
ad illam veritatem quae ultima in Dei revelatione ostendetur”, in: John Paul II., Encycli-
cal Letter Fides et Ratio, nos. 2-3.
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inclusivism in light of this insight from set theory. A set A includes a set 
B (A ⊇ B), if B is a subset of A and is contained in A. If there exists at least 
one element of A which is not contained in B, then A is also a proper 
superset of B, or, equivalently, B is a proper subset of A. Th is relation is 
antisymmetric, because if A ⊇ B with A ≠ B, then B ⊇ A is false. Assume, 
as an example, a relationship of inclusion between a religion S with its 
truth claims S1, S2, S3 … Sn and a religion P with its truth claims P1, P2, P3 
… Pn. If P is a proper subset of S, all the truth claims of P must be con-
tained in S (so that S1 = P1, S2 = P2, and so forth) and there exists in S at 
least one truth claim Sn+1, which is not contained in P. 
However, it is clear that the model of inclusion of set theory thus ar-
ticulated is not applicable to the issue of religious inclusivism. Even if the 
latter entails an antisymmetric relation between two religions (with a set 
of truth claims or only one truth claim of P as a subset of the truth claims 
of S), P could not be considered as a proper subset of S insofar as not all 
truth claims of P are contained in S. In this regard, the idea of inclusivism 
refers more to the intersection of two diff erent sets, which contains all 
elements – i.e. truth claims – of P that also belong to S. But on the other 
hand, the concept of intersection does not express an antisymmetric re-
lation as it is implied in the notion of inclusivism.
Consider an example. Religion P entails the three central and basic 
propositions {a, b, c}. Religion S entails {b, c, d}, religion T {c, d, e} and 
religion U {d, e, f}. Here, P’s truth claims b and c are included in S, and 
its claim c in T. No truth claim of P is included in U – but it would be 
possible for an adherent of P to suppose that, for the time being, no truth 
claim of P has yet been identifi ed as contained in U. Even with this simple 
example, we can draw three conclusions for the position of inclusivism: 
there might be (1) one religion all of whose (or whose core) truth claims 
are true, (2) diff erent degrees of inclusivity with regard to the number of 
truth claims of P that are contained within diff erent religions, (3) a hi-
erarchy of religions from the perspective of P according to the number 
of the truth claims of P that they contain. It should be mentioned that 
this interpretation is simplifi ed in that it focuses solely on the number of 
occurring truth claims. It is also possible – though I am not going to do 
so – to emphasise the meaning of truth claims within diff erent religions 
and infer from that particular hierarchies. 
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My explication of the core ideas of epistemic inclusivism shows us 
that there are epistemic advantages of inclusivism in comparison to 
exclusivism and pluralism.21 With regard to exclusivism, the position of 
inclusivism is better diff erentiated in terms of the relation between one’s 
own religion and other religions. Th e traditional exclusivist analyses 
solely, under the principle of self-contradiction, the compatibility of the 
central truth claims of a diff erent religion with his own core truth claims. 
In the case of incompatibility between these two sets of claims, the exclu-
sivist tends to deny the truth and salvifi c force of the whole other religion 
– otherwise he would hold a form of inclusivism (as I have defi ned it). 
Inclusivism allows one to assert the absolute truth of one’s own religion 
while affi  rming that salvation is also possible for non-Christians. With 
regard to pluralism, the idea of inclusivity sketched allows a religious 
person fi rst to refer to her self-understanding and maintain the (non-
mythological) truth of her single religion, and second to defi ne a hierar-
chy of religions diff erent from her true religion that are not completely 
false, but, on a sliding scale, partially true.
III. AN EPISTEMIC FRAMEWORK FOR INCLUSIVISM
Despite these advantages, this model of inclusivism still needs a more 
solid philosophical underpinning. How is it possible for the inclusivist to 
hold, on the one side, the exclusivity of truth claims of her own religion 
which excludes incompatible alien religious claims, and, on the other 
side, an inclusion of a truth claim or a set of truth claims of her religion 
in the alien belief? As was shown, the inclusivist maintains that only her 
religion R is true and that there is a hierarchy of religions which are, on 
a sliding scale, either partially true (depending on the number and the 
meaning of contained true claims of R) or even false (because no truth 
claims of R are contained). I would like to delineate only two aspects as 
an epistemic framework for the model of inclusivism:
21 Recall that I am referring to a traditional and more restrictive form of exclusiv-
ism. A ‘traditional exclusivist’ holds that only her own religion is true if there are no core 
claims of an alien religion which are compatible with the core claims of Christianity (for 
example, the claim that salvation is only available through faith in Christ).
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(1) It is possible that diff erent religions refer to the same God in dif-
ferent ways. Th is can be illustrated with a simple example: At t1 observer 
A sees from a distance that a tower looks round, whereas to observer 
B, who is even further away, the tower appears rectangular.22 At t2, the 
persons get closer and both see that the tower is, in fact, round. Hence, 
at t1 two contrary beliefs are held, but – as is revealed at t2 – the two ob-
servers have been successfully referring to the same object. Th is clearly 
emerges as we consider the conditions of perception of the truth claim. 
At t1 observer B was able to give sound reasons for his belief, while from 
A’s perspective it is clear that B is not mistaken in referring to the same 
object, but is mistaken in his description thereof. From his perspective, 
A has sound reasons to assume both that he is correct at t1 and that B is 
referring to the same object (for instance because B is pointing at it). At 
this point it is helpful to distinguish three types of reference based on 
John Searle’s theory of reference in Speech Acts: 
 (a) fully consummated reference, which identifi es the object un-
equivocally, 
 (b) successful reference, which though not complete is successful,
 (c) unconsummated and failed reference, which fails to lead to an 
identifi cation of the object.23 
Compared to both Quine’s general skepticism with regard to the success 
of the act of reference (even within the system of one’s own language), 
and the causal theories of reference developed by Kripke and the early 
Putnam, Searle’s descriptive theory of reference has the advantage of 
conceptualizing the identifi cation of the object of reference as a perfor-
mative act, which with the aid of descriptors or markers can lead to un-
equivocal identifi cation. Th us, according to Searle, successful reference 
is potentially fully consummated reference.24 
It is precisely this transition that is at the stake in the example given 
above. Th e situation at t1 is a case of successful reference: Th e tower is 
22 Th e example originates from Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, chap. 
XIII, Cambridge (Mass.) 22000, 69 (I am grateful to Erik Baldwin for this hint).
23 John Searle, Speech Acts, 82; Searle does not explicate separately the third form of 
reference.
24 Ibid., 82.
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successfully identifi ed as the object of reference by both A and B, though 
only B refers to it in an incomplete mode. Epistemic inclusivism might 
rephrase the performative act of reference as follows: From the internal 
perspective of a religion E, reference to God within the religion F can be 
conceived of as a case of successful, though not complete, reference.25 It 
points in the right direction, allowing identifi cation and thus distinc-
tion between God and idol, yet, from the internal perspective of E, still 
remains provisional compared to E’s own more precise reference.26 Con-
sider, as an example in the fi eld of religion, the following belief:
(B) Th e one God is not triune.
Both the Christian inclusivist and exclusivist share the view that (B) is 
incompatible with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and, thus, agree 
that it is false. But, in contrast to the exclusivist, the inclusivist still can 
acknowledge that there is an ‘element’ of the Christian faith included 
in (B). Obviously, (B) contains the monotheistic belief that there is one 
God. So, in terms of reference, the inclusivist may argue that (B) is a case 
of a successful reference to the object of the Christian belief, in which 
case (B) is able to identify the Christian God but remains incomplete 
given that (B) does not acknowledge God’s triune existence. Th e exclu-
sivist cannot grant there is an element of truth in (B). See, for instance, 
the following defi nition:
Exclusivism maintains that the central claims of Christianity are true, and 
that where the claims of Christianity confl ict with those of other religions 
the latter are to be rejected as false. Christian exclusivists also characteristi-
cally hold that God has revealed himself defi nitively in the Bible and that 
Jesus Christ is the unique incarnation of God, the only Lord and Savior. 
25 Of course this is not to say, as John Hick’s pluralist theology of religions might, that 
all religions refer successfully, though necessarily imperfectly, to a transcendent reality.
26 Can religion E still revise its strong and central beliefs? From E’s internal perspec-
tive, its own truth claim is, at root, the certainty that no such revision will take place, 
either at t3 or at tn. However, the foundational certainty that this involves relates only to 
the successful identifi cation of the object of reference ‘God’, not to the scope of the set 
of propositions that can be predicated by it. Th is becomes clearer when we consider as-
pect (b).
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Salvation is not to be found in the structures of other religious traditions.27
Exclusivists and inclusivists share the view that claims which are incom-
patible with their own religious claims are false. But the inclusivist is not 
therefore automatically forced to reject the other religion. With regard 
to the incompatible claim of the other religion the inclusivist is able to 
examine carefully whether it is based on an unconsummated and failed 
reference (and is therefore false) or on a successful though incomplete 
reference (and is therefore at least partially true). Th us, accepting in-
complete reference to the same object permits the inclusivist to accept 
that ‘false statements’ about that object may be partially true. Th is view 
is available only to the inclusivist but not to the exclusivist – otherwise 
the latter would hold some sort of ‘covert inclusivism’. Th is idea of an 
incomplete though successful reference does not only apply to particular 
truth claims but also to religions as theories.
(2) Understood as theories, religions are under-determined and, with 
respect to the scope of the set of propositions that they uphold, not nec-
essarily complete. For instance, if we understand the belief system of 
a religion as theory T1 with the truth claims S1, S2, S3 . . . Sn, then from an 
internal perspective it is not ruled out that T1 might, in light of ‘progress 
towards the fullness of truth’ develop into T2 with the truth claims S1, S2, 
S3 . . . Sn, Sn+1 (broadening of the set of propositions) or S1*, S2*, S3* . . . Sn* 
(unfolding or revision of certain propositions or attitudes). Within the 
Catholic Church, numerous examples of this can be found in the history 
of dogma. Examples of broadening include for instance the Mariologi-
cal dogmas of the 19th and 20th centuries. Examples of revision include 
attitudes towards the freedom of religion. And examples of unfolding 
include the understanding of revelation. Th is insight entails recognition 
of a certain form of doctrinal contingency: From the internal perspec-
tive of a given religious community, its own teaching is true at t1, while 
it is not excluded that this truth may be capable of being expressed more 
comprehensively and precisely at t2. If a religious tradition disputes such 
27 Harold A. Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of 
Truth, Vancouver 1997, 9. See also ibid., 112: “Christian exclusivism . . . contends that 
where the central claims of Christian faith are incompatible with those of other religious 
traditions the latter are to be rejected as false. Th us, for example, it has traditionally been 
said that the Muslim and the orthodox Christian cannot both be correct in their respec-
tive beliefs about the identity of Jesus of Nazareth.”
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underdeterminedness and thus the possibility of extending or deepening 
of its core beliefs, then it can only be described as radically exclusivist.
With regard to the notion of inclusivity, the two aspects allow for the 
possibility that a particular religious truth claim as well as a religious 
belief can be considered as being “approximately true”.28 On the basis 
of this interpretation, it is possible to reconstruct an inclusivist position 
philosophically, while still upholding the ultimate truth of a certain veri-
tas capta, yet without excluding the possibility that the veritas ultima 
might be more comprehensive and profound.
 
IV. CONCLUSION
Inclusivism is not, as John Hick claims, a “somewhat astonishing doc-
trine”. Against Hick’s pluralism, the inclusivist holds that religions are 
referring successfully to God. Hick maintains that substantial properties 
(such as ‘omnipotence’ or ‘being a person’) cannot be ascribed to the 
divine reality29 and that religious truth claims are, at best, mythologi-
cally but not literally true.30 We now see how it is that, for Hick’s plural-
ism, religions are unable to refer successfully to the divine reality. Because 
of the transcategoriality of the divine reality, reference to what religions 
call ‘God’ or ‘Allah’ or whatever is unable, according to Hick’s theory, to 
identify the divine reality in itself. So when Hick, for example, points out 
unequivocally that “the ultimate reality, the Real, cannot be described 
as a personal God”, it follows that within Hick’s pluralism the Christian 
attempt to refer to God as a person remains unsuccessful as it fails to 
identify God as he is in himself.31 
28 Cf. Laurence BonJour, Reply to Solomon, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 50 (1990), 779-782, 779f. See also: Lorenz B. Puntel, Th e Rationality of Th eistic 
Belief and the Concept of Truth, in: Godehard Brüntrup/Ronald K. Tacelli (eds.), Th e 
Rationality of Th eism, Dordrecht 1999, 39-59, here 53, who speaks of a relative “truth 
status”: “Only at the end of the day, that is, when all factors (data, aspects, alternatives, 
and the like) have been taken into account and examined, will it be possible to establish 
‘the truth’, that is, the fully determinate status of the sentences stated and the proposi-
tions articulated.”
29 See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcend-
ent, New Haven/London 2004, 239.
30 Ibid., xix-xxii, 348. 
31 For an attempt to clarify Hick’s theory with regard to reference see Peter Byrne, 
140 BERND IRLENB ORN
Against exclusivism, and without relinquishing the exclusivity that 
is logically inherent in her truth claims, the inclusivist can (i) accept 
a plurality of heterogeneous attitudes and thus co-exist at least with 
a minimal pluralism, (ii) on the basis of her own doctrinal contingency 
even learn from this other position and supplement or deepen her own 
teaching, and (iii) when faced with another religious belief or conviction, 
ascribe to that other position an inclusivity of truth claims of the home 
religion. Th at is, she can consistently concede that members of other re-
ligions make successful although incomplete references to God. Th us, 
a form of moderate exclusivism should not be called ‘inclusivism’ if it 
identifi es the inclusivity of, at least, one of its own truth claims within the 
tenets of a diff erent religion.
As we know, divergent truth claims of religions harbor a particular 
potential for both ethical and political confl ict. Th ey do so on the one 
hand when combined with a radically exclusivist attitude, and when they 
involve both strong and exemplary beliefs, thus creating a clash of world 
views upon which identities are constructed. Th ey do so, on the other 
hand, when the members of the religious communities concerned lack 
suffi  cient intellectual and social competence to manage these confl icts 
both cognitively and politically, and to call into question an unjustifi ed 
coherence of strong religious and political beliefs. Th e inclusivist model 
is empirically and epistemically the most viable position to adopt in re-
sponse to the challenge of the plurality of religious truth claims. In my 
opinion, the challenge of the plurality of religious views consists fi rst and 
foremost in the problem of whether the members of a religious commu-
nity are willing to acknowledge their particularity de facto, without there-
fore having to relinquish the truth claim of their own religion. In this 
respect the concept of epistemic inclusivism off ers major advantages.32
Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism: Reference and Realism in Religion, London 1995, 
31-55, 191-203.
32 I am grateful to Jeremy Neill and especially to Erik Baldwin for their comments on 
an earlier draft  of this paper.
